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Curbing Excessive Force:
A Primer on Bariers to
Police Accountabliity
Kami N. Chavis & Conor Degnan

ecause Philando Castile's girlfriend live streamed his last moments on
Facebook, many are familiar with how he died at the hands of a police
officer. On July 6, 2016, Officer Jeronimo Yanez saw Mr. Castile driving
near the state fairgrounds with his girlfriend and her daughter. According to Officer
Yanez, he believed that Mr. Castile's "wide-set nose" appeared to match surveillance
video of a suspect involved in an armed robbery that occurred days earlier.' Because
police officers had pulled over Mr. Castile multiple times in the past, he knew to have
his seatbelt fastened, and gave the officer his insurance card. 2 Mr. Castile also informed
Officer Yanez that he was carrying a firearm.' Before he could assure Officer Yanez
that he was not going for his gun, Officer Yanez fired seven shots, killing him. In his
last breath Mr. Castile exclaimed, "I wasn't reaching for it."
Mr. Castile is just one of several unarmed African-American men who have died
at the hands of the police over the last several years. Although tensions between police
and communities of color have long been an issue, a succession of recent allegations
of excessive force by police officers has garnered widespread public attention and
admonition. The names of Michael Brown in Ferguson,' Eric Garner in Staten Island,
Tamir Rice in Cleveland, Freddie Gray in Baltimore, and Walter Scott in North
Charleston5 are etched in the public consciousness as rally points for those who call
for increased police accountability.
Police accountability has sparked fierce debate among scholars, media pundits, and
the public at large. 6 A 2016 Gallup poll highlights the stark divide in Americans' views
of police, with just over half of Americans polled expressing a great deal or quite a lot

This Issue Brief was initially published in April 2017.

1 Christina Capecchi & Mitch Smith, Officer Who Shot Philando Castile Is Charged with
Manslaughter,N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 16,2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/17/us/philando-castileshooting-minnesota.html?_r= 0.
2 Id.
3 MINN. STAT. 5624.714 (1)(b) ("Display of permit; penalty. (a) The holder of a permitto carry [a
weapon] must have the permit card and a driver's license, state identification card, or other governmentissued photo identification in immediate possession at all times when carrying a pistol and must display
the permit card and identification document upon lawful demand by a peace officer, as defined in section
626.84, subdivision 1.").
4 Jon Swaine & Oliver Laughland, DarrenWilson Will Not Face FederalChargesin Michael Brown
Shooting, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/mar/04/
darren-wilson-federal-criminal-charges-michael-brown-shooting.
s Joseph P. Williams, Why Aren't Police Prosecuted,U.S. NEWS (July 13, 2016), https://www.usnews.
com/news/articles/2016-07-13/why-arent-police-held-accountable-for-shooting-black-men.
6 Chris Fuchs, Debate Over Police Accountability, After Peter Liang Conviction, Spans Generations,
NBC NEWS (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/debate-over-police-accountabilityafter-peter-liang-conviction-spans-generations-n527926.
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of trust in the police, 7 while 14% expressed very little or no confidence in the police.8
Unreliable governmental data may prevent us from knowing exactly how pervasive
police shootings are in the United States, but a project of The Guardianto track the
number of people killed by law enforcement suggests that roughly 1,090 people were
killed by the police in 2016.9 These incidents include justified uses of force, suicide by
cop, and excessive uses of force. Meanwhile, failure to hold individual police officers
accountable for seemingly egregious uses of excessive force, coupled with a perceived
lack of police accountability more generally, has led to increased political activism,
most notably through the Black Lives Matter movement, as well as occasional civil
unrest among members of some of the most deeply affected communities.
Despite increased public scrutiny, prosecution of officers involved in shootings is
quite rare. According to data Philip Stinson at Ohio's Bowling Green State University
collected, since 2005, only thirteen officers have been convicted of murder or manslaughter for a fatal, on-duty shooting.10 During the same timeframe, only fifty-four
officers nationwide were criminally charged after they shot and killed someone in the
line of duty. As of April 11, 2015, twenty-one of the officers had been acquitted and
eleven were convicted, with the remaining twenty-two cases either pending or filed in
the "other" category. The high acquittal rate is perhaps even more troubling given that
in 80% of these cases, one of the following occurred: there was a video recording of
the incident, the victim was shot in the back, other officers testified against the shooter,
or a cover-up was alleged.1
Even when what appears to be an excessive use of police force is captured on video,
prosecutors often decline to prosecute the officers (e.g., the shooting of Tamir Rice)
or juries fail to convict them if the case goes to trial (e.g., the shooting of Walter Scott).
So what are the challenges to holding police officers accountable? Criminal prosecutions are notoriously difficult, but tort suits, internal investigations, and citizen oversight also have not been a panacea of reform. When a police officer is accused of using
excessive force, they are afforded a multitude of protections that are unavailable to
civilian defendants. These protections have proven to be effective shields for officers
from both criminal and civil liability and in many cases lead to public mistrust of
police, particularly in communities of color.
This Issue Brief summarizes some of the traditional mechanisms for holding police
accountable for misconduct, offers a critique of each, and ends with suggestions for
the future of police accountability. Part I focuses on some of the legal and structural
impediments to police accountability including the inherent conflicts of interest that
frequently prevent local prosecutors from prosecuting police officers accused of using
excessive force. Part I also discusses how the doctrine of qualified immunity shields

7 Frank Newport, U.S. Confidence in Police Recovers from Last Year's Low, GALLUP (June 14,
2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/192701/confidence-police-recovers-last-year-low.aspx (finding that
that only 56% of Americans have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the police. This figure is up
from 52% in 2015).
1 Id.
The Counted: People Killed by Police in the U.S., GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-us-database (last visited Mar. 27,2017).
10 Matt Ferner & Nick Wing, Here's How Many Cops Got Convicted of Murder Last Year for OnDuty Shootings, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/police-shootingconvictionsus_5695968ce4b086bc1cd5d0da. This figure does not include instances where civilians died in
police custody or were killed by other means or situations where officers faced lesser charges.
11 Id.; see also Williams, supranote 5 ("A Wall Street Journal report in 2015 found approximately 1,200
people had been killed by police, but no officers were found guilty of murder or manslaughter.").
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officers from civil liability when a suspect is harmed or dies in police custody. Part II
explores how the Department of Justice (DOJ) has failed to properly leverage its
authority to investigate patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing to increase
police accountability. Part III discusses potential solutions, including the impact policeworn body cameras, prosecutorial independence, and increased civil oversight may
have on police accountability. 12

I.

STRUCTURAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES
TO POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY

Criminal and civil liability are two of the avenues available to hold individual police
officers accountable for excessive use of force. Unfortunately, criminal prosecution of
police officers seems precluded in all but the most exceptional cases, while qualified
immunity often insulates officers from civil liability. Even where civil suits are successful or victims receive settlements, prosecutors rarely pursue criminal charges against
police officers for excessive force."
A. INHERENT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BETWEEN
LOCAL PROSECUTORS AND THE POLICE
Experts have long argued that the lack of criminal prosecutions for excessive force
is the result of the inherent conflict of interest that arises when local prosecutors are
charged with investigating and prosecuting police officers.14 This conflict largely stems
from the symbiotic relationship between prosecutors and the police.s Prosecutors
depend on the police for evidence, information, and witnesses. 6 The police rely on
prosecutors to provide legal advice and convict civilian defendants." If one entity fails
to perform their duties as expected, the other suffers.
The police serve on the front lines of the criminal justice system. Police officers
conduct investigations, gather evidence, and make arrests." These important functions
occur largely out of the public view and are crucial to the success of any prosecution.
Furthermore, police investigations usually implicate important constitutional rights
that must be respected to avoid later challenges, including rights enshrined in the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment. 9 It is therefore paramount that prosecutors
have full faith in the police.
Additionally, police officers are the primary fact gatherers and are afforded great
deference when deciding how to build a case against a defendant. 20 Police officers
can choose which leads to track down and decide what facts are relevant to a

12

42 U.S.C.

5 14141

(2000).

13 See, e.g., Kimberly Kindy & Kimberly Kelly, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted,WASH. POST (Apr.

11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/11/thousands-dead-few-prosecuted/
("Only in rare cases do prosecutors and grand juries decide that the [force] cannot be justified").
14 Kami Chavis Simmons, Increasing Police Accountability: Restoring Trust and Legitimacy
Through the Appointment of Independent Prosecutors,49 WASH. U.
iS Kindy & Kelley, supra note 13.

J. L.

& POL'Y 137 (2015).

16 Id.
17 Id.

is Id.
19 See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 435 (1966); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
20 Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion:Automated Suspicion, Big Data,and Policing,
10 HARV. L. & PoL'Y REV. 15 (2016).
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particular case. Prosecutors also rely on the police to inform them of any exculpatory
evidence they may be constitutionally obligated to share with defense counsel. 21
Furthermore, many local prosecutors personally know most of the officers that work
in their jurisdiction. 22
These close ties results in a clear conflict of interest when prosecutors are called to
prosecute police officers. 23 It seems questionable that prosecutors can maintain professional objectivity when investigating and prosecuting such close professional allies. 24
Furthermore, if a prosecutor's office successfully prosecutes an officer, resentment and
distrust may jeopardize future cases. The tensions between supporting a trusted ally
and zealously investigating and prosecuting criminal conduct is why prosecutors have
an unwaivable conflict of interest when prosecuting police officers.
Since the police are the primary fact gatherer in any case, their testimony and credibility are crucial to the success of a criminal prosecution. According to former prosecutor Paul Butler, a prosecutor's main function is to ensure the fact finder believes a
police officer's testimony. 25 At the same time, prosecutors are sworn to serve the public
guided solely by their commitment to justice. 26 When civilians are charged with a
crime, the prosecutor must do everything to ensure an officer testifying in that case is
credible and trustworthy. Anytime an officer is accused of excessive force, his or her
credibility and reasonableness is called into question. 27 This may jeopardize any pending or future cases involving that particular officer. Even beyond that particular officer's credibility, accusations of misconduct can undermine the entire department, as
civilians question whether police officers are performing their duties in accordance
with the law. When a prosecutor charges a police officer with excessive force, therefore,
the prosecutor risks undermining the very trustworthiness he or she may need for
justice to be done in other cases. 28
At least one commentator equates the conflict arising in police defendant cases with
situations in which a prosecutor is charged with a crime. 29 Prosecutors routinely conflict out of cases where another prosecutor from the same office is charged with a
crime. This decision to conflict out is usually voluntary and is likely done to maintain
the appearance of impartiality.3 0 If prosecutors are so quick to conflict out of a case
where a fellow prosecutor is charged with a crime, then why do prosecutors not recuse
themselves when police officers stand accused?
The inherent conflicts that arise when prosecutors are called to investigate the police
are also analogous to those that arise when the police investigate themselves. Internal
affairs investigations face conflicts of interest because many officers do not "want to

21 Emily Gillespie, Legal System, Law Enforcement at Odds Over Brady List, THE COLUMBIAN (Nov.
15, 2015), http://www.columbian.com/news/2015/nov/15/legal-system-law-enforcement-at-odds-overthe-brady-list/.
22 Kate Levine, Who Shouldn't Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447 (2016).
23 Kindy & Kelly, supra note 13.
24 Id.

2s Levine, supra note 22.
26 Id.
27 Conor Friedersdorf, Judging the Cops: When Excessive Force Trumps Resisting Arrest, ATLANTIC
(Mar. 21, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/03/where-excessive-force-meetsresisting-arrest/388297/.
21 See generally Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of Silence" as Evidence of Bias

and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233 (1998).
29 Levine, supra note 22.
30 Id.
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be seen as violating the 'code of silence' endemic in police culture or as disloyal to their
fellow officers." A clear example of this conflict of interest is the Danziger Bridge
shooting cover-up in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. In that case, the supervisors tasked
with investigating the officers who shot several unarmed civilians participated in the
department's cover-up attempt, and were later indicted for their participation.32
When so few accusations of excessive force are subject to criminal investigation, it
is important the prosecutors responsible for those cases evaluate them seriously and
objectively." Unfortunately, it may be difficult for a prosecutor to remain neutral when
he or she is called to investigate their closest and most trusted professional ally.
B. THE GRAND JURY AS A PROP FOR PROSECUTORS IN POLICE CASES

When police officers are accused of excessive force, prosecutors can opt to present
the case to a grand jury rather than make the charging decision themselves. On its
face, this process seems to eliminate the inherent bias of local prosecutors, discussed
above, by presenting evidence to an impartial group of people who make up the grand
jury and allowing them to decide whether to indict. Too often, however, the grand
jury operates as a tool for local prosecutors to effectively relieve themselves of the
responsibility to make a charging decision and insulate themselves from public backlash if the grand jury does not indict.34 Any appearance of objectivity dissolves when
one considers the process by which a case is presented to the grand jury.
Generally speaking, the prosecutor plays a crucial role in grand jury proceedings.
The prosecutor controls the proceedings by obtaining the evidence, calling witnesses,
and instructing the grand jury members on the law.3 s Members of the grand jury are
lay persons that are likely inexperienced with legal matters and therefore inclined to rely
on the prosecutor." With this much control over the process, it is a dubious assertion
to say presenting a case to the grand jury removes bias from the charging decision in
excessive force cases. The rate at which grand juries vote to indict police officers compared to civilian defendants justifies this skepticism. For example, in the span of one
year, out of 150,000 potential federal prosecutions, only eleven grand juries refused to
indict. 7 Over the same year period, less than a third of the 11,000 cases alleging police
misconduct resulted in criminal charges." This significant disparity is almost certainly
influenced by the inherent conflict of prosecutors investigating police officers.
Observers have fiercely criticized the prosecutor's behavior and use of the grand
jury in the failed indictment of Officer Darren Wilson for the shooting death of Michael
Brown in Ferguson, Missouri." Transcripts from the proceeding show prosecutors

31 Kami N. Chavis, Body-Worn Cameras:Exploring the UnintentionalConsequences of Technological
Advances and Ensuring a Role for Community Consultation, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 985 (2016).
32 See Ex-New OrleansCops Get Prison Time in DanzigerBridge Shootings, CNN (Apr. 4,2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/04/justice/louisiana-danziger-bridge-case/index.html.
" Marshall Miller, Police Brutality, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 149, 154 (1998).
34 Joshua Hegarty, Who Watches the Watchmen? How ProsecutorsFail to Protect Citizens from
Police Violence, 37 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.

J. PUB.

POL'Y & PRAC. 305 (2016).

35 Douglas P. Currier, The Exercise of Supervisory Powers to Dismissa Grandjury Indictment-A
Basis for CurbingProsecutorialMisconduct, 45 OHIO ST. L. J. 1077, 1079 (1984).
36 Id.
37 Mark Motivan, FederalJusticeStatistics 2010-StatisticalTables, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
(Dec. 2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjslOst.pdf.
38 Hegarty, supra note 34, at 320.
39 Jake Halpern, The Cop, THE NEW YORKER (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2015/08/10/the-cop.
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cross examining potential witnesses whose testimony may have supported criminal
charges by suggesting a police officer is allowed to shoot a fleeing suspect regardless
of the officer's fear of the suspect. 40 One commentator noted that the grand jury operated more as a trial court with the prosecutors serving as defense attorneys. 41 Similar
questionable prosecutorial behavior occurred during the grand jury proceedings
against the officers involved in the shooting of twelve-year old Tamir Rice. In that
case, the prosecutor, Timothy McGinty, presented three expert reports that stated the
shooting was appropriate, 42 described the death of Tamir Rice as "a perfect storm of
human error," 43 and successfully recommended the grand jury decline to indict. 44 The
unusual nature of the proceedings in these cases casts doubt on the fairness of the
grand jury and the impartiality of the prosecutor. 4s It also calls into question the value
of the grand jury system in any excessive force case.
The inability to indict the officers in these cases defies the old adage that a prosecutor can get a grand jury to indict a ham sandwich. 46 Given what we have learned about
prosecutor behavior from these high-profile cases, and the relatively low indictment
rate in excessive force cases in general, it seems reasonable that, even when not making
charging decisions themselves, prosecutors' conflicts of interest often results in grand
juries unwilling to indict police officers.
If conflicts of interest prevent local prosecutors from pursuing cases against police
officers or discouraging grand juries to indict, then why does the federal government
not step in to prosecute the police? Federal officials can intervene and prosecute officers
under 18 U.S.C. 55 241 and 242 when states fail to effectively prosecute police officers. 47
Under these statutes, however, federal prosecutors must prove not only that a violation
occurred, but the officer willfully violated someone's constitutional rights. 48 In addition, DOJ policy is to defer to state prosecution of police officers, with potential federal
prosecution serving only as a back-stop. 49 Therefore, the vast majority of excessive
force cases are handled in state court, where prosecutors with inherent conflicts of
interest too often either refuse to prosecute the police or rely on grand juries to dispose
of nearly all excessive force cases.
C. DIFFICULTY IN OVERCOMING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code, a citizen who believes he or she
was the victim of excessive force may seek civil damages against the responsible law
enforcement officer for depriving the citizen of his or her constitutional right to be
free from unwarranted government intrusion. The advantages of 5 1983 suits compared
40

Id.

41 Victoria Knott, Reconsidering the Use of the Grandjury: EliminatingProsecutorialDiscretion

to Indict Law Enforcement Officers, 38 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 202, 225 (2016).
42 Hegarty, supra note 34, at 322.
43 Jamil Smith, The Tamir Rice Rule, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 29, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/
article/126737/tamir-rice-rule.
44 Id.
45 Hegarty, supranote 34, at 321 ("The transcripts were then released to the public, which is unusual
when considering that grand jurors are sworn to secrecy.").
46 Ben Casselman, It's Incredibly Rare for a Grandjury to Do What Ferguson'sJust Did, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Nov. 24, 2014), https://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/ferguson-michael-brown-indictment-darren-wilson/.
47 Chavis Simmons, supra note 14, at 501-02.
48 Ivana Dukanovic, Reforming High-Stakes Police Departments:How FederalCivil Rights Will
Rebuild ConstitutionalPolicing in America, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 911, 914 (2016).
49 Chavis Simmons, supra note 14, at 502.
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to criminal charges are: there is a lower burden of proof required to prevail; citizens
may sue the government directly; and a successful action results in compensation for
victims and their families.
The doctrine of qualified immunity, however, creates a significant hurdle for plaintiffs seeking relief under 5 1983.so This immunity is available to state actors, such as
police officers, and shields them from civil liability, provided they did not violate an
individual's constitutional rights. Therefore, in order to recover damages in a 5 1983
action, a plaintiff must prove to the court or jury that the officer violated "clearly
established" law at the time of the incident." This standard is highly deferential to
the state actor, leading courts to dismiss many, if not most, cases prior to trial. The
result is that too often courts have no opportunity to assess the accusations of excessive force and reviewing courts, including the Supreme Court, never have the opportunity to evaluate those lower courts' assessments. As a result, the unconstitutionality
of seemingly egregious behavior never has the chance to become "clearly established"
52
law, stymying efforts to increase accountability or secure institutional reform.

Plaintiffs must overcome two substantial hurdles if they hope to succeed in a 5 1983
action. First, the plaintiff must prove the officer's use of force was objectively unreasonable, and second, the law was so clearly established at the time of the incident,
that a reasonable officer must have known the force was objectively unreasonable. 5 1
The court decides whether the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a
constitutional right and whether a right is clearly established. Some say the qualified
immunity defense "provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law." 54 Consequently, victims of police force face an
uphill battle to prove liability.
The seminal Supreme Court cases Tennessee v. Garner5 5 and Grahamv. Connor6
and their progeny establish the legal standard applied in excessive force cases. The
Court in Garnerheld that apprehension of a suspect through the use of deadly force
constitutes a seizure subject to the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement. 5 7
Courts "must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to
5
justify the intrusion."s
This balancing test takes into account the totality of the circumstances, considering not only when the seizure was made but also the manner of
seizure. The Court further held that "deadly force may not be used unless it is
so 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (2000) ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage,... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or
omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.").
s Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the
FederalReform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489 (2008).
s2 Alexandra Holmes, Bridging the Information Gap: The Department of Justice's "Patternor
Practice" Suits and Community Organizations,92 TEX. L. REV. 1241 (2014).
5 Tahir Duckett, UnreasonablyImmune: Rethinking QualifiedImmunity in FourthAmendment
Excessive Force Cases, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409 (2016).
54 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
ss 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
56 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
s7 Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12.
ss Id. at 8 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
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necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the
suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or
others." 9 Furthermore, the Court advised that officers should provide a warning where
feasible prior to application of deadly force.60
The Court further clarified the constitutional requirements for application of force
in Graham v. Connor. The Court held that use-of-force scenarios must be analyzed
under the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard.6 ' The reasonableness of the officer's actions are judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on
scene taking into account the fact that "officers are often forced to make split-second
decisions-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about
the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." 62 This evaluation is
made without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officer at the time
force is applied.6' Additional considerations include the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of officers or others,
whether the suspect displays an apparent, deadly weapon, and whether the suspect is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. 64
In addition to the framework discussed above, the Supreme Court provides further
protection under the "could have believed standard" and the "mistaken belief standard" for assessing the reasonableness of an officer's actions. The Court set forth the
"could have believed standard" in Hunter v. Bryant.6 s Police officers are absolved of
liability "if a reasonable officer could have believed [the conduct] to be lawful, in light
of clearly established law and the information the [] officer possessed."66 This standard
precludes liability if an officer incorrectly, yet reasonably, believes their use of force
was lawful. This protection is described as a mistake of law defense that protects
officers that misinterpret clearly established law.
While the Huntercase involved a mistake of law, the case of Saucier v. Katz involves
mistakes of fact. 67 The Court held in Saucier that officers are immune from suits
where a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful
relying on facts that later prove to be false. The Court went on to say "if an officer
reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that a suspect was likely to fight back, for instance,
the officer would be justified in using more force than in fact was needed.",6 In Saucier
situations, an officer can make a mistake as to the facts and the level of force

S9

Id.

60 Id. at 11-12 ("[I]f the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to

believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical
harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has
been given.").

61 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
62

Id.

63

Id.

64 Id. at 396.
6S 112 S. Ct. 534 (1991).
66 Id. at 536 (explaining that a Ninth Circuit panel previously held that the secret service agents
were entitled to qualified immunity for arresting the plaintiff without a warrant because the warrant
requirement, at the time, was not clearly established in situations where the arrestee consented to law
enforcement agents' entry into a residence).

67 121 S. Ct. 2151 (2001).
61 Id. at 2158.
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necessary, provided it was objectively reasonable at the time the force was applied in
light of any mistake of fact.69
Case law and scholarly comment reveals that overcoming qualified immunity is a
nearly insurmountable burden. 70 Police officers are afforded every benefit of the doubt.
The force used is judged from the perspective of an officer on scene without the benefit
of hindsight at the precise moment the force was used.71 Reasonable mistakes based
on mistaken beliefs of both law and facts usually serve to insulate officers from liability.
The test is not whether less drastic means were available, but whether the officer's
actions were objectively reasonable. 72 Given these protections, it is not surprising that
many civil suits against police officers fail.
II.

THE UNREALIZED POTENTIAL OF DOJ'S
PATTERN OR PRACTICE AUTHORITY

The previous sections focused on bars to accountability when a single officer is
accused of excessive force. But what happens when an entire agency is accused of a
pattern or practice of engaging in constitutional violations? Allegations of systemic
police abuse of citizens are a complex problem without a straightforward cure.73 While
it is easy to identify the misconduct of individual officers when isolated incidents occur,
these individual instances of misconduct may indicate the existence of a larger problem
that permeates an entire law enforcement agency. 74 Therefore, reform efforts must
address both the individual officers and the culture of the police department that
fosters unconstitutional policing.
For this reason, in 1994, as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act, Congress adopted 42 U.S.C. 5 14141, which authorizes the DOJ to seek injunctive relief against law enforcement agencies that demonstrated a "pattern or practice
of conduct by law enforcement officers ... that deprives persons of rights, privileges,
or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States."
Congress adopted 5 14141 after recognizing the need for systematic reform of law
enforcement agencies.76 Prior to its enactment, there was no federal mechanism
available to enjoin law enforcement agencies' unconstitutional practices.7 7 Many of
the pattern or practice actions to date have resulted in reforms that aim to rehabilitate
problem departments through the implementation of early warning tracking systems,

'9 See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009) (holding that, in resolving qualified immunity
claims, courts need not first determine whether the facts alleged by a plaintiff make out a violation of a

constitutional right).
70 See, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 125 S. Ct. 596 (2004); Armstrong v. Village of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d
892 (4th Cir. 2016); Fenwick v. Pudimott, 778 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524
(4th Cir. 2011); Milstead v. Kibler, 243 F.3d 157 (4th Cr. 2001).
71 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 395 (1986).
72

J. Michael

McGuinness, PracticalConsiderationsin ProsecutingandDefending Police Misconduct

Claims: Investigations,Law, Expert Evidence, Strategy and Tactics (Georgetown University Law Center

Continuing Legal Education, 2006 WL 5839041, 2006).
73 Chavis Simmons, supra note 51, at 496.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 506-07 (explaining that the predecessor to 5 14141, the Police Accountability Act, was
passed in response to the Rodney King beating and was the result of a subcommittee investigative report
that identified police misconduct as endemic and concluded that the federal government lacked statutory
authority to address patterns or practices of police misconduct).

7

Id.
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mandating collection of racial profiling data, and implementing mechanisms for
citizen oversight."
There is no consensus among scholars as to the impact of 5 14141, though critiques
abound.79 Whether enforcement is limited by resources, political will, or a failure to
fairly and effectively identify law enforcement agencies for which investigation is
appropriate, 0 it is our conclusion that 5 14141 is all bark and no bite. To understand
why, one must consider the manner in which the DOJ has chosen to exercise its authority under 5 14141.
For the most part, rather than filing lawsuits, the DOJ prefers to use the threat of
litigation to pressure targets of an investigation to agree to a negotiated settlement."
For many years, the focus on negotiated settlements saved both time and money and
allowed the DOJ to review more departments.82 While this tactic has resulted in some
successful enforcement efforts, the practical effect has been a neutering of the statute
and exclusion of the public from the negotiation process.
The policy of negotiating settlements and working with law enforcement to achieve
reform carried the day until the DOJ arrived in Alamance County. A two-year DOJ
investigation of the Alamance County Sheriff's Department had revealed widespread
racial profiling of Hispanics." The investigation uncovered significant indications of
racial bias, the most egregious example being a captain who sent "his subordinates a
videogame premised on shooting Mexican children, pregnant women, and other
'wetbacks."' 8 4 This "systematic racial profiling of Latinos" 85 permeated the department, including the sheriff himself. Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that when
the DOJ proposed that Alamance work with federal officials to develop a plan for
reform, the sheriff declined to negotiate." This failure to cooperate led the DOJ to
pursue the first lawsuit under 5 14141 since enactment of the statute in 1994.87
Nearly a year after the case was argued, District Judge Thomas D. Schroeder issued
his opinion. In a 2 53-page opinion, Judge Schroeder held that the DOJ failed to show
a pattern or practice of unconstitutional behavior." The judge found "no evidence
that any individual was unconstitutionally deprived of his or her rights under the
7 Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governanceand the "New Paradigm"of Police Accountability: A
DemocraticApproach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 373 (2010).
79 Stephen Rushin, Competing Case Studies of Structural Reform Litigation in American Police
Departments, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 113 (2016).
'0 Id.; see Chavis Simmons, supra note 51, at 518-19 ("In addition, because authority to seek injunctive relief rests solely with DOJ, enforcement of the statute is completely reliant on the limited resources
available within the Department of Justice. Thus, even an administration with a commitment to aggressively enforce the legislation would be limited to the available departmental resources. As with any federal
mandate, without adequate appropriations from Congress to fund the enforcement of DOJ pattern or
practice litigation, DOJ could be forced to shift its priorities to other civil rights agendas.").
81 Chavis Simmons, supra note 51, at 493-94.
82 Rushin, supra note 79, at 136.
83 Id. at 137.
84 Id.
8s Michael Biesecker, U.S. Files Civil Rights ComplaintAgainst N.C. Sheriff, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.myrtlebeachonline.com/news/local/articlel6638044.html.
86 Rushin, supra note 79, at 137. Additionally, "' [t]he Alamance County commissioner,
all white,'

strongly supported Sheriff Johnson's resistance to federal intervention, 'praising his hard-line stance
against illegal immigration."' Id. (citing David Zucchino, North CarolinaTown Split Over Sheriff's
Treatment of Latinos, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/23/nation/
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Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment."" The judge further rejected statistical evidence
the DOJ offered purporting to show a pattern of discrimination. 0 Though the judge
made certain to scold the Sheriff's Department for their decisions to use racial epithets
and slurs, these instances of bias were deemed insufficient to show a pattern or practice
that violated constitutionally protected rights.91
The failure of the Alamance County trial is significant. The DOJ's first attempt to
mandate reform through the exercise of its authority under 5 14141 resulted in devastating defeat. Unfortunately, the Alamance County case may lead more law enforcement agencies to resist negotiated settlements with the DOJ. Before the Alamance
County case, police departments had little in the way of examples to gauge their
chances of successfully defending a 5 14141 suit. Agencies now have a benchmark of
comparison for their own conduct. This may give some departments the confidence
to resist negotiated settlements, forcing the DOJ to either abandon efforts to encourage
reform in those departments or forego less resource intensive negotiated settlements
for litigation that has now proven to be riskier than previously thought. This places
the utility of 5 14141 in jeopardy, since its reforms have, up to this point, depend significantly on departments' willingness to negotiate with the DOJ.
While the district court held that the DOJ failed to establish a pattern or practice,
it did not clearly establish the standard of proof required for success. 92 Consequently,
the trial of the Alamance County Sheriff's Department unfortunately raises more
questions than it answers. What evidence must the DOJ put forth to establish a pattern
or practice within the meaning of the statute? Will the success of the Alamance County
Sheriff's Department encourage other departments to push back against DOJ intervention? Can the DOJ successfully reform an agency under 5 14141 without the cooperation of the agency itself?
The DOJ announced it will appeal the district court decision, providing the appellate court the opportunity to clarify many of these issues.93 Unfortunately, unless and
until those answers are provided, it is an open question whether the DOJ can successfully convince a district court to enjoin agencies under 5 14141 at trial despite evidence
of egregious behavior, such as that presented in the Alamance case.
In addition to the open question of the DOJ's ability to successfully litigate pattern
or practice cases, the infrequency with which the DOJ undertakes such investigations
calls into question its ability to identify problem police departments. Some of this
difficulty stems from the DOJ's reliance on records produced by the departments it is
tasked with investigating. 94 Records of use-of-force situations are often inaccurate or
incomplete.9 s Without adequate records, the DOJ cannot properly identify whether a
problem exists within the department and whether pursuing an investigation is appropriate. Relying on records produced by the department being investigated is

'
Michael D. Abernethy, Judge Dismisses DOJ Case Against Johnson, Finds No Evidence of
UnconstitutionalPractices,TIMES NEWS (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.thetimesnews.com/article/20150807/
NEWS/150809283/?Start=1.
90 Rushin, supra note 79, at 138.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 139.

9' Anna Johnson, Despite DOJ Appeal, Alamance Sheriff's Office Once Again Eligible for State,
Federal Grants, TIMES NEWS (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.thetimesnews.com/article/20151029/
NEWS/151028706.
94 Chavis Simmons, supra note 51, at 516-17.
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counter-productive to reform efforts, as departments have strong incentives to stay
off the DOJ's radar.
Furthermore, there are concerns that 5 14141 fails to capture individual instances
of misconduct, as it only targets misconduct that rises to a pattern or practice of misconduct. 6 It is easy to identify egregious instances of police misconduct involving one
or a few bad officers in an isolated case. It is more difficult to string together instances
of misconduct such that it constitutes a pattern or practice as required by the statute.97
Victims of isolated incidents of abuse are left only with the traditional tort remedies
in state court. For example, federal intervention in a jurisdiction whose policies would
be considered inadequate or subpar when compared to other jurisdictions would not
be possible unless a pattern of misconduct had emerged. Thus, 5 14141's requirement
that there be a pattern or practice of unconstitutional behavior might shield certain
jurisdictions from scrutiny.
Finally, Congress granted sole discretion to initiate suits enjoining unconstitutional
practices to the executive branch under 5 14141.9' Therefore, Congress precluded private
citizens from suing for injunctive relief when they fall victim to a department's unconstitutional practice. The lack of a private cause of action leaves 5 14141 vulnerable to
the political whim of the administration in power. The current Attorney General, Jeff
Sessions, has already noted his disdain for federal intervention in local law enforcement
agencies and it is almost certain that enforcement of the pattern or practice authority
will be severely curtailed, if not halted altogether under his leadership.99

SOLUTIONS TO INCREASE POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY

III.

The previous sections have described several impediments to police accountability
at both the state and federal level that may explain why police officers are rarely held
accountable for their actions when excessive force is alleged. Commentators have
identified several avenues for reform to increase both transparency and accountability
when officers are accused of excessive force.
A. PROMOTING ENFORCEMENT UNDER § 14141
Despite various shortcomings in its pattern or practice authority, there are several
ways that the DOJ could improve its use of 5 14141. First, the DOJ should commit to
vigorously litigating 5 14141 cases in which a law enforcement agency refuses to enter
into a consent decree. If the DOJ backs down after the district court's adverse ruling
in the Alamance County case, other departments may "roll the dice" and decline to
come to an agreement with the DOJ. The threat of time consuming, costly litigation,
and the negative publicity such litigation will create are critical to bringing non-compliant law enforcement agencies to the negotiating table.
The DOJ should also pursue more consent decrees as opposed to memoranda of
agreement (MOAs). Some refer to consent decrees as "MOA[s] with teeth" because
they are formal, court ordered settlements that provide for judicial oversight. 00 An
96
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MOA is simply a contract between the government and a suspect department without
any real judicial enforcement ability.101 The benefit of consent decrees is they allow
for the "federal government, states, and localities to agree on proactive systems of
preventing future misconduct and civil rights violations." 102 If the department fails to
carry out its obligations under a consent decree, the judiciary can step in to provide
the appropriate remedy.103
The New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) consent decree represents one of
the most comprehensive agreements the DOJ has entered to date, and should serve as
a model for future consent decreeS. 104 Most notable is the degree of transparency
incorporated into the development of the decree and selection process for the monitor.
Pursuant to the consent decree, the NOPD must implement significant policy changes
regarding "use of force, illegal stops, searches and arrests, custodial interrogations,
photographic line-ups, discriminatory policing, community engagement, recruitment,
training, officer assistance and support, performance evaluations and promotions,
supervision, [and] misconduct investigations."1 05 This consent decree focuses particularly on the NOPD's standards regarding use of force. It requires the NOPD to regulate
uses of force ranging from empty-hand control, in which the officer uses bodily force
to gain control, to lethal force. 1 06
Following the establishment of a consent decree, a special monitor is appointed to
ensure compliance on the part of the department. This monitor is usually a team of
consultants who have prior experience in law enforcement management, pattern or
practice litigation, or other professional management reforms. 107 The monitor provides
quarterly reports detailing the department's compliance efforts. When the monitor
determines the department has sufficiently complied with and satisfied at least 94% of
the agreement and the district court accepts the judgment, the monitor team disbands.10s
Consent decree monitoring and reform can take anywhere from a few years to over a
decade. In order to improve enforcement under 5 14141, the DOJ could require closer
to 100% compliance with the terms of the consent decree. While this may increase the
time a department remains subject to a consent decree, requiring departments to more
substantially comply may be necessary to ensure reform is complete and lasting.
The DOJ should also conduct follow up studies of targeted agencies to determine
the extent to which reforms are durable past the monitoring phase.' The DOJ admits
it has "not studied the long-term outcomes at the law enforcement agencies it has
targeted." 1 o The DOJ's current model focuses on agencies under consent decrees
achieving certain benchmarks, at which point the agency is again left to its own
devices. Unless there is some mechanism to ensure that the measures undertaken to
101 Id. at 920.
102
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address unconstitutional policing practices will create durable reforms, departments
run the risk of slipping back into old habits once the DOJ, monitors and courts have
turned their attention elsewhere. This risk is particularly acute as a department's
personnel turns over, eroding the institutional memory of the reasons certain policies
and procedures are necessary to ensure constitutional policing. 1
For example, in 1997, the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police became the first law enforcement agency subject to a consent decree under 5 14141.112 In the years since satisfying
the consent decree, the Bureau has engaged in questionable practices that include
"absence of timely and independent investigations into officer misconduct, extreme
uses of excessive force, and shuffling of police chiefs."" It is possible that the underlying causes of these incidents could have been addressed through additional monitoring
and review after the termination date of the consent decree.
One observer found that DOJ officials support creating follow-up teams to return
to agencies previously under consent decree to assess their continued compliance and
prevent backsliding. 114 To ensure reform is permanent, the DOJ should incorporate
this follow-up process into consent decrees.1 1 5 Ideally, DOJ would include a follow-up
clause in every consent decree, but in reality, the DOJ may not have sufficient resources
to follow-up with every department. Therefore, it is necessary to tailor follow-up efforts
by identifying signs of resistance early in the process, under the theory that departments
resistant to reform may also be more likely to backslide. Follow-up requirements could
incentivize departments to sustain reform and avoid further federal intervention.
Unfortunately, the near-term future of 5 14141 investigations is uncertain, given
the election of Donald Trump and the appointment of Jeff Sessions as Attorney
General. Prior to Trump's inauguration, the DOJ signed a consent decree with the
Baltimore Police to address concerns over a pattern or practice of constitutional violations.116 The administration also released a report concerning excessive use of force
by the Chicago Police Department. The Chicago Police Department appears receptive
to working with the DOJ; however, reform efforts are in flux under the Trump
Administration.11 7 Attorney General Sessions has been a fierce critic of federal intervention that forces local police to adopt reforms, calling federal consent decrees
"undemocratic" and an "end run around the democratic process."ns In a March 31,
2017, memorandum to U.S. attorneys and DOJ department heads, Attorney General
Sessions stressed the need for local accountability, asserting that, "[i]t is not the
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responsibility of the federal government to manage non-federal law enforcement
agencies."" 9 He further directed his staff to review all "existing or contemplated
consent decrees... ensure that they fully to promote" these principles. 120 On April 3,
2017, DOJ lawyers unsuccessfully sought to delay implementation of a consent decree
with the embattled Baltimore Police Department that was announced towards the end
of the Obama administration. 121 These signals from the Trump administration and
Attorney General Sessions suggest that we will witness a substantial curtailment of
pattern or practice investigations in the coming years, placing the future of 5 14141 as
a viable tool to promote police accountability in doubt.
B. IMPLEMENTING POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERAS

Widespread adoption and implementation of body-worn cameras could potentially
mitigate some difficulty victims of police misconduct experience, especially in 5 1983
cases. Body cameras objectively capture interactions police officers have with citizens.
This is valuable given the objective reasonableness standard applied in officer use-offorce cases. Furthermore, if the victim passes away, body camera footage is the most
reliable evidence to rebut an officer's account of the event. A camera has no agenda,
it simply records what happens.
A threshold question when an officer is accused of excessive force is whether the
force applied was objectively reasonable at the moment it was applied. 122 If a prosecutor, court, or jury determines the force applied was reasonable, then criminal and civil
penalties are no longer available. As discussed above, the reasonableness of the force
applied depends on several factors, including, the actions of the suspect, the presence
and proximity of weapons, and the immediacy of the threat to officers and others. 123
Without body camera footage, it becomes the word of a victim or other witnesses
against the officer regarding the nature of the interaction leading to the use of force.
The problem with this dynamic is, generally, the victims in excessive force cases are
not sympathetic victims.124 Furthermore, juries tend to believe police officers are credible people who tell the truth.125 Couple this with the fact that the account of the officer
that applied the force is usually bolstered by the reports of other officers present when
the force was applied. If a jury is inclined to believe one officer over the victim, they
will surely believe multiple officers corroborating each other's accounts over that of the
victim. When used correctly, body cameras resolve this dilemma by offering an unbiased
perspective, in real time, of the interaction between the officer and victim.
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recording will show the actions of all parties captured, in addition to statements given
by officers and the victim. 127 Furthermore, it will show the exact length of time between
first contact and the application of force. 128 This recording takes much of the guess
work out of the equation and serves as a check for the reliability of the officers' reports.
Additionally, there is research indicating the presence of body cameras deters police
misconduct. 129 For example, a study in Rialto, California, randomly assigned cameras
to officers then collected data for a year. 30 The results of the study are promising.
Reported use-of-force incidents on shifts without body cameras were double that of
shifts where officers were equipped with a body camera.' Throughout the department, use-of-force incidents dropped by 60% and citizen complaints dropped by
88%.132 Similar results have been found across multiple studies in different cities. 3
These results are promising, as they suggest the presence of body cameras can prevent
misconduct before it occurs, because when officers and citizens know they are being
recorded, it changes the way they interact with one another.
Body cameras benefit both the public and the police. When a person is killed by a
police officer during an encounter, citizens often demand accountability. Determining
whether the officer was at fault is often difficult without a truly objective means to
evaluate the officer's conduct. Body cameras are a tool capable of providing the objective perspective necessary to ensure accountability. As a result, body cameras can aid
in holding officers accountable for misconduct, because citizens will have access to
valuable information to rebut officer claims that force was reasonable. 13 4 Cameras can
also insulate officers from liability against frivolous complaints of misconduct by
allowing officers to use the footage to support the reasonableness of their actions.13 s
In fact, some police chiefs have publicly endorsed the use of body cameras as a law
enforcement tool. One chief encourages his officers to let citizens know the camera is
recording believing that "it elevates behavior on both sides of the camera."136
Body cameras alone will not clear the path for successful litigation of legitimate
excessive force cases. This is due, in part, to the standards used to establish qualified
immunity, which remain unaffected by the use of body cameras. When assessing the
reasonableness of an officer's use of force, courts and juries must still take into account
that "officers are forced to make split second decisions in situations that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving." This allows officers to argue that even if, in hindsight,
video appears to show unreasonable use of force, in the heat of the moment their decision to use force was, in fact, objectively reasonable. Department policies regarding
use of force can also affect how courts assess the reasonableness of an officer's use of
force. Unfortunately, too many departments fail to provide sufficiently robust
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guidelines against the unnecessary use of force.13 7 Additionally, in those cases in which
video can establish that the use of force was objectively unreasonable, a victim of
excessive force must still show that the officer violated a "clearly established" law. 3
Until the Supreme Court revisits the standard set in Garner,Connor and their progeny
victims of excessive force will find only limited success in using body camera footage
to hold police accountable.
C. AVOIDING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST THROUGH
INDEPENDENT PROSECUTORS

As discussed above, local prosecutors face an inherent conflict of interest when
called to prosecute police officers. 9 To resolve this conflict, local prosecutors should
be required to recuse themselves when police officers in departments with which they
work are accused of excessive force. 140 The best way to ensure neutrality in the prosecution of police officers is to bring in an impartial prosecutor from outside the district.
Policies could include appointing a prosecutor from a neighboring district, or the state's
attorney general's office to handle excessive force cases.141
1. Appoint Prosecutorsfrom NeighboringDistricts
Assigning prosecutors from neighboring districts to handle cases involving officers'
excessive use of force offers several advantages. First, it removes the appearance of
impropriety on the part of the prosecution. Prosecutors and law enforcement from
different jurisdictions rarely come into contact with one another. An outside prosecutor likely does not have as close of a working relationship with the officer and therefore,
arguably, faces less of a conflict of interest. The independent prosecutor will feel less
restricted to investigate and charge an officer and is less likely to use the grand jury
process to avoid an indictment.
Second, prosecutors from neighboring districts in the same state are already familiar
with the laws and procedure in the state where they practice. Therefore, an appointed,
outside prosecutor will be well versed in the laws, allowing officer cases to proceed as
any normal criminal case.
Finally, district attorneys' offices routinely require prosecutors to recuse themselves
when conflicts arise in other situations, such as when another member of their office
is accused of a crime. 142 Therefore, it would be relatively seamless for district attorneys'
offices to simply extend this policy of recusal to cover officer cases.
This approach is, however, susceptible to criticism. State prosecutors from neighbor143
ing jurisdictions are still vulnerable to some of the pressures local prosecutor's face.
Potential conflicts could arise because of political pressures, the impact that aggressive

137 A survey of ninety-one law enforcement agencies revealed that only one-third "require officers to
de-escalate situations, when possible, before using force" or "exhaust all other reasonable alternatives before
resorting to using deadly force." DERAY MCKESSON, ET AL., CAMPAIGN ZERO, POLICE USE OF FORCE
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prosecution of a police officer could have on a prosecutor's relationship police in their
own district, and the statewide influence that powerful police unions can exert. 144
2. Appoint State Attorneys General
Appointing the state attorney general's office to handle police cases is another way
to remove bias from the process. If the attorney general's office handles all police cases,
this will foster the opportunity for prosecutors to specialize in the prosecution of
officer cases. Additionally, if all officer cases are handled from a central location, it is
easier to collect data on these types of cases. 145 The attorney general's office is also
less susceptible to the local and personal influences that may cause conflicts with
prosecutors from neighboring districts.

146

One commentator notes that most states have a procedure in place for the attorney
general's office to step in when a district attorney's office identifies a conflict. 147
However, the attorney general's office rarely takes over a case absent the district attorney's office's voluntary recusal. 148 Increasing public and political support for this
approach may incentivize district attorneys to conflict out of officer cases and allow
the attorney general's office assume responsibility for these prosecutions.
3. Special ProsecutorLaws and Their Shortcomings
To date, only Connecticut has enacted legislation to allow for the appointment of a
special prosecutor in police-related deaths. 149 Under the law, police-involved death cases
are referred to the Division of Criminal Justice and the state's chief attorney is empowered to, at his or her discretion, appoint a special prosecutor.1 5 0 Other states lawmakers
have attempted to introduce similar legislation requiring independent prosecutors in
use of force cases, including Missouri and Pennsylvania. 15 1 In other states, such as New
York, the executive branch has taken the lead in enacting reform. After a grand jury
failed to indict the officers involved in the death of Eric Garner, New York Governor
Andrew Cuomo issued Executive Order No. 147, which directs the state attorney general
152
to prosecute cases where unarmed civilians die at the hands of the police.

There are two primary criticisms of existing statutes or executive action relating
to independent prosecutors. First, in both Connecticut and New York an independent
prosecutor may only be appointed in instances where an officer's use of force results
in death. However, there is a strong argument that independent prosecutors should
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also be utilized when the amount of force is excessive, resulting in significant injuries,
yet falls short of lethal force. Second, it is important to recognize that if the office that
is conflicted is allowed to choose their replacement, this could undermine the independence that the law seeks to create. Therefore, legislation addressing the appointment of independent prosecutors should specifically include a mechanism to ensure
objectivity in choosing a special prosecutor, by requiring the state attorney general or
the DOJ to appoint the special prosecutor.
D. PROMOTING CITIZEN OVERSIGHT
A final way to improve police accountability is for jurisdictions to establish a means
for citizen oversight in police cases through the creation of civilian review boards. 1 5 1
Such a board could assist the prosecutor and law enforcement in investigating allegations of excessive force. 154 Members could include community leaders, retired law
enforcement, local attorneys, and former judges. 1 5 5
Though civilian review boards can increase the sense that police are accountable
to the community, there are several issues that constrain civilian review boards. First,
critics have long argued that civilian review boards are generally "weak, ineffective,
and poorly led." Too often, these boards' oversight is largely retrospective, making
them ineffective at addressing police misconduct until well after is occurs.1 5 6 These
boards generally lack any real power to hold officers or departments accountable.1 5 7
Because they typically neither have access to the entire court file, nor the power to
investigate while the case is ongoing, civilian review boards often do not gain access
to valuable information until well after the case is resolved.1 5 Second, these boards
are plagued by lack of funding.1 5 9 Without money to pursue investigations, it is difficult to fully evaluate the case. This limits the number of cases the board can review,
forcing them to pick their battles, much like the DOJ under 5 14141.
Finally, existing review boards generally have limited leverage over the police
departments they are tasked with investigating.1 6 0 They can usually only report their
findings and make a recommendation to the chief of police or the local government,
who have the ultimate enforcement authority to either carry out or ignore the review
board recommendation. Additionally, because these boards often include an equal
number of current or former law enforcement officers as civilians, they are viewed as
overly sympathetic to the interests of police officers, even in cases involving excessive
use of force. 61 While these boards need to work closely with local law enforcement

153 Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841, 872 (2012)
("Approximately twenty percent of large police departments have some form of civilian review."); David

Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699,1802-03 (2005) ("The vast majority of
big-city police departments are now subject to some form of civilian oversight. The institutional structure
of that oversight varies widely.").
154 Levine, supra note 22, at 1494.
1ss Id.
1s

Chavis Simmons, supra note 14.

157 Id.
1ss See Thomas Moriarty, Court Order Leaves Newark Police Review Board Toothless, Activists
Say, NJ.COM (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2016/12/injunction-against-newark-police-review boardprom.html (detailing a 2016 injunction, which limited the investigatory and
subpoena power of the Newark Civilian Review Board).

159 Joanna C. Schwartz, Who Can Prosecute the Police?, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437 (2016).
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and government, disproportionate association with law enforcement leadership can
run the risk of over-sympathizing with the very entities they are tasked with overseeing. 162 If review boards are designed to include individuals who are motivated to seek
justice, not play sides, they will have more legitimacy in the eyes of the public and will
more effectively review cases with independence and impartiality.
Currently, there are more than 200 citizen oversight entities in existence across the
country with various structural models. 163 For example, the Berkeley, California, citizen
review board conducts its independent investigations alongside the police department's
internal affairs division. 164 The D.C. Office of Police Complaints makes the facts and
their findings in a case available to the public, thereby increasing transparency.1 6 s In
Flint, Michigan, prior to its dissolution, the Office of the Ombudsman's citizen review
board maintained independence in the face of local pressures by having the city council
appoint members. 166 The Office of Professional Accountability in Seattle, Washington,
has an office a few blocks away from the police department so civilians can file complaints about police conduct without having to go to a police station.1 6 7
As these examples demonstrate, civilian review boards need to have real power to
effectuate change.1 68 To ensure they have the power they need to be effective, jurisdiction should design civilian review boards with the following features:
169
Power to subpoena, investigate, and bring charges against officers.
Authority to compile reports they can distribute to the general public summarizing their findings and recommendations.
Membership that includes licensed attorneys to participate in the review process with the authority to file suit against an officer under 5 1983.
Adequate funding to conduct thorough investigations.
Freedom from political influence with a non-partisan board committed to
170
increasing accountability.

*
*
*
*
*

While there are positive aspects of existing civilian review boards, no single board
combines each of the features described above. However, if properly implemented,
civilian review boards can provide the public with the opportunity to have its voice
heard and the power to effectuate lasting reforms.
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CONCLUSION
Police officers are tasked with a valuable function in our society-keeping individuals
and communities safe from violence and crime and maintaining public order. Discharging
these duties may put a police officer's own personal safety at risk. Current policies and
legal standards reflect the belief that to maintain public safety and their own safety
police must be allowed to use force when discharging their duties. Because of this ability
to use force, however, our legal system must also provide mechanisms to hold law
enforcement officers accountable. When a police officer's use of excessive force injures
or kills an individual, or when a police department engages in a pattern of unconstitutional behavior, public trust is eroded and tensions between police officers and the
communities they serve are heightened. A failure to hold law enforcement officers and
agencies accountable further deepens this mistrust and threatens their legitimacy.
Holding law enforcement accountable for misconduct, therefore, is inextricably linked
with maintaining the safety of our communities and enforcing the rule of law.
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